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Gorrell, deceased, initiated this action to determine the
ownership of $43,748.00 in cash found by Mrs. Gorrellfs husband
following his wife's death.

Mr. Gorrell found the money in a

heart shaped beauty box that had been hidden in an agate blue
roasting pan located in a kitchen cupboard in Mrs. Gorrell?s
home.

First Security claims that the money is an asset of the

estate and should be distributed through the estate.

Mr.

Gorrell challenged First Security's claim that the money was
the property of the estate.
The District Court heard testimony from Mr. Gorrell
and Normandy W. Johnson, Mrs. Gorrellfs daughter
(R. 57-161).

Based upon that record, the District Court

found that the money was in the possession of Mrs. Gorrell at
the time of her death and concluded that First Security had
established a prima facie case that Mrs. Gorrell owned the
money.

(R. 161-62).

Accordingly, consistent with Utah law,

the District Court placed upon Mr. Gorrell the burden of
proving his title to the money.

(R. 162). The District Court

found that on the evidence presented, Mr. Gorrell failed to
carry his burden of proof.

(R. 40, 163). The District Court,

therefore, ruled that the money was an asset of the estate.
(R. 41, 163).

All citations herein are to the Record on Appeal as
paginated by the Clerk of the District Court.
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Mrs. Gorrell handled all of the business affairs of
the family.

(R. 80). Mr. Gorrell testified that Mrs. Gorrell

was "very careful" with money, (R. 85), and that she
"controlled" all the money.

(R. 112-13).

Mr. Gorrell also

testified that Mrs. Gorrell kept cash around the house.

(R.

Mrs. Gorrell?s daughter confirmed that Mrs. Gorrell kept

106).

cash at home because of a fear of banks arising out of her
experiences during the Depression.

(R. 152). Mrs, Gorrellfs

daughter also testified that Mrs. Gorrell purchased a new car
in 1967 for $2,700.00 and paid a hospital bill of $1,200.00
both with cash.

(R. 159-60).

The money at issue in this action was discovered by
Mr. Gorrell in a heart shaped beauty box which had been hidden
in a blue agate roasting pan.

(R. 86-87).

Mr. Gorrell had no

knowledge of the existence of the money until he discovered
it.

(R. 39). Mr. Gorrell discovered the money while

rearranging the kitchen cupboards on the day of Mrs. Gorrellfs
death.

(R. 86-87).

done any cooking.

During the marriage, Mr. Gorrell had never
(R. 87). Only after Mrs. Gorrell died and

Mr. Gorrell had to prepare his own meals did he have any
contact with the household's cooking utensils.

(R. 87). Mr.

Gorrell testified he did not know where the money came from.
(R. 88). Instead, he agreed that only Mrs. Gorrell knew the
source of the money.

(R. 88).
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The Court of Appeals1 analysis

clearly demonstrates that it substituted its own assessment of
the facts for that of the District Court.

The Court of

Appeals, however, did not find or rule that the District
Court's findings were "clearly against the weight of the
evidence" as required by Utah law.

Thus, in reversing the

District Court's judgment, the Court of Appeals failed to give
proper deference to the District Court's factual findings.
B.

The District Court's Factual Findings Are
Supported By The Evidence.

The dispute between the parties concerns the ownership
of the money found by Mr. Gorrell following his wife's death.
If the money was owned by Mrs. Gorrell, it is an asset of her
estate that must be distributed in accordance with the terms of
her will.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that once the

representative of a decendentfs estate establishes prima facie
evidence that the property was owned by the deceased at the
time of death, the burden of proving title to the property
shifts to the party asserting an adverse claim.
P.2d at 996.

Hall, 504

A prima facie case of ownership of cash is

established by proving possession of the cash.

Gray's Harbor

Lumber Co. v. Burton Lumber Co., 65 Utah 333, 236 P. 1102,
1103 (1925).
The District Court explicitly found that the money
discovered by Mr. Gorrell was in Mrs. Gorrell's "possession and

-6-

control" until the time of her death.

(R. 161-62).

This

finding is amply supported by the evidence in the record.

Mr.

Gorrell had no knowledge of the money's existence prior to
discovering it.

(R. 39). Mr. Gorrell testified that Mrs.

Gorrell handled the family's business affairs, (R. 80, 112-13),
and was very careful with money.

(R. 85). The money was found

in a heart shaped beauty box which had been hidden in a blue
agate roasting pan in a kitchen cupboard.

(R. 87). Mr.

Gorrell testified that he had done no cooking while his wife
was living.

(R. 87). He found the heart shaped beauty box on

the day his wife died while rearranging the kitchen cupboards
to make access easier for himself.

(R. 86). All of these

facts support the District Court's finding that the money was
in the control and possession of Mrs. Gorrell up until the time
of her death.

The District Court's finding also is confirmed

by the fact that the record contains absolutely no evidence
that even so much as suggests that anyone other than Mrs.
Gorrell had possession of the money up until Mr. Gorrell
discovered it after his wife died.

The record clearly

establishes that the District Court's factual finding that the
money was in the possession of Mrs. Gorrell at the time of her
death is not contrary to the weight of the evidence.

Moreover,

under Utah law, proof of possession of cash constitutes prima
facie evidence of ownership.

Gray's Harbor, 236 P. at 1103.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the

-7-

District Court's finding that First Security had established a
prima facie case that Mrs. Gorrell owned the money.

Garcia,

645 P.2d at 653; Hall, 504 P.2d at 996.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING IS CONTRARY
TO UTAH LAW.

As argued above, the District Court properly found
that Mrs. Gorrell possessed the money up until the time of her
death.

In Utah, possession of cash or notes establishes a

prima facie case of ownership.

Grayys Harbor, 236 P.2d at

1103; accord, In re Bickford, 74 111. App. 2d 190, 219 N.E.2d
159, 162 (1966).

The Bickford case illustrates the

application of the possession rule in a factual context
remarkably analogous to the facts present in this case.

In

Bickford, the estate sought to recover $2,507.00 in cash that
was found by the respondent in the decedent's apron following
her death.

As here, the trial court found that the decedent

possessed the money at the time of her death thereby creating a
prima facie case of ownership by the decedent.

The trial court

further found that the respondent had not satisfied his burden
of proving title to the money.

On appeal, the Illinois

Appellate Court affirmed, reasoning that
Since we find possession to have been in decedent
we must further find that Respondent did not meet
his burden of proving ownership in himself . . . .
219 N.E.2d at 162.
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In this case, the Court of Appeals cited facts
pertaining to the length of the Gorrell's marriage and the work
histories of Mr. and Mrs. Gorrell in support of its conclusion
that First Security had failed to make a prima facie showing
that Mrs. Gorrell owned the money at the time of her death.
740 P.2d at 270. In effect, the Court of Appeals required
First Security to produce evidence of the source of the money,
in addition to evidence of possession, to establish the prima
facie case of ownership.

In that respect, the Court of

Appeals' ruling is contrary to the rule established by Gray's
Harbor.

Accord, Bickford, 219 N.E.2d at 162.
To the extent that the Court of Appeals decision may

be construed to be based on a finding that Mr. Gorrell
contributed to the funds that were found in the heart shaped
beauty box, the finding is not supported by the record. Mr.
Gorrell admitted he did not know where the money in the heart
shaped beauty box came from, but that only Mrs. Gorrell knew
the source of that money.

(R. 88). The record also contains

ample evidence that Mrs. Gorrell brought substantial assets
into the marriage, (R. 64), while Mr. Gorrell had nothing.
65).

(R.

Mrs. Gorrell was very careful with money, (R. 85), and

kept cash in her possession at least in part due to a distrust
of banks resulting from the Depression.

(R. 106, 152). Based

on the evidence presented at trial, the District Court found
that there was an equal likelihood that the source of the money

-9-

was Mrs. Gorrell solely, or Mr. Gorrell solely or both Mr. and
Mrs. Gorrell.

(R. 162-63).

The District Court concluded that

"there is absolutely no way I can determine which of those, or
which combination of those events occurred/'

(R. 163).

Since

the District Court found that the source of the money had not
been established by the evidence, the only basis for
determining ownership is possession, which the District Court
found in favor of Mrs. Gorrell.
III. RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE BY THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT IS IMPORTANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
UTAH LAW.
This case presents the important issue of how claims
of ownership of personal property, especially cash, are to be
resolved in probate proceedings.

The need for a clear test for

resolving such disputes is particularly important because the
best source of evidence, testimony from the decedent, is not
available.

The decision of the Court of Appeals undermines the

certainty of prior Utah case law which holds that possession of
cash establishes a prima facie case of ownership, see, e.g.,
Gray's Harbor, and that once a prima facie case of ownership
is established by an estate's personal representative the
opposing claimant bears the burden of proving title to the
property.

See, e.g., Hall.

The Court of Appeals1 decision

fails to follow this precedent by requiring proof of the source
of the property in addition to proof of possession to establish
a prima facie case of ownership.
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As this case illustrates, the

additional proof required by the Court of Appeals often will
not be available because the sole competent witness is the
decedent.

The Court of Appeals1 rule is impractical and it

should be rejected in favor of the rule established by Gray's
Harbor, Hall and Bickford.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner First Security Bank, as the personal
representative of the Estate of Katherine Wentland Gorrell
seeks a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals.

The writ

of certiorari is appropriate and necessary in this case because
the decision of the Court of Appeals is not consistent with
prior rulings of this Court, because the Court of Appeals
improperly substituted its assessment of the facts for the
findings of the District Court and because the case presents an
opportunity for this Court to settle an important issue of Utah
law.
DATED this 13th day of October, 1987.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Michael J. Glasmann
David L. Deisley
Attorneys for Petitioner, First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A.
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ESTATE OF GOR 3LL v. GORRELL
Cite as 740 P.2d 2

though she did not have to rule out all
other possible non-negligent causes, she did
have to offer evidence showing that the
balance of probabilities weighed in favor of
negligence. Id. See also Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 248
(W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).

Utah

267

(UtahApp 1987)

mary judgment in this type of case.
Where, however, the record indicates
that plaintiff has [had] every opportunity
to establish his case and has failed to
demonstrate that he could show negligent acts or omissions . . . [on the part of
the] defendant by expert medical testimony, where the issue is clearly one which
cannot be determined by laymen alone,
summary judgment could be allowed.
Chiero v. Chicago Osteopathic Hosp., 74
Ill.App.3d at 177, 29 Ill.Dec. at 654, 392
N.E.2d at 211 (quoting Hill v. Durkin, 58
Ill.App.3d 1003, 1008, 16 Ill.Dec. 372, 376,
374 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (1978)).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to respondents.

[3] In order to create a genuine factual
dispute on this point, Robinson thus had to
come forward with evidence to counter Dr.
Burke's affidavit opinion—that non-negligent causes of her infection were probable—with expert testimony to the effect
that Robinson's infection most likely resulted from negligence, assuming it was possible to find an expert who could and would
make such a statement.1 The depositions
of respondents' doctors relied upon by appellant simply do not do the job. They
provide no evidence that Robinson's infection was most likely caused by negligence,
notwithstanding what the doctors might
have believed on March 21,1982, before the
laboratory test results were received.
Since appellant did not submit evidence creating a genuine issue of fact about the
most likely cause of her injuries, the trial
judge properly proceeded to conclude that
respondents were entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
We agree that trial courts should be extremely cautious in granting summary
judgment for a defendant on the basis that
plaintiff has failed to secure expert testimony to support a medical negligence action. Ckiero v. Chicago Osteopathic
Hosp., 74 Ill.App.3d at 176, 29 Ill.Dec. at
654, 392 N.E.2d at 211. But appellant contends that a plaintiff suing on a theory of
res ipsa loquitur is always entitled to a trial
on the merits, so that summary judgment
is always inappropriate. Such an argument miscomprehends the purpose and application of the doctrine, as well as the
pretrial responsibilities of a plaintiff faced
with a summary judgment motion. In this
regard, we concur in the reasoning of the
appellate court quoted in Chiero:
We agree that if there is any sound basis
to do so, a trial court should reject sum-

The Second District Court, Weber
County, David Roth, J., found cash asset to
be solely asset of wife's estate, and husband appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Bench, J., held that representative of estate
failed to establish prima facie case of ownership of cash found hidden in box by evidence that wife owned home in which couple lived and that husband had no prior
knowledge of hidden cash, where husband
lived with wife in home for over 22 years,

1. We give no credence to appellant's claim that
she was unable to obtain an expert opinion

supporting her negligence action without the
discarded needles.

GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.

In the Matter of the ESTATE, OF Katherine Wentland GORRELL, Deceased,
v.
Robert E. GORRELL, Appellant
No. 860113-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 27, 1987.
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Utah

740 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

and husband made significant financial contributions to marriage.
Reversed.
Executors and Administrators <s=>85(5y4)
Evidence that wife owned home in
which couple lived and that husband had no
prior knowledge of hidden cash did not
establish prima facie case of ownership of
cash discovered by husband in box hidden
in roasting pan, and husband thus did not
have burden of proving ownership of cash,
where husband and wife lived together in
home for 22 years, wife worked for only
three or four years after marriage and
then retired, and husband made significant
financial contributions to marriage.

Pete N. Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, Ogden,
for appellant.
Michael J. Glasmann, Ogden, for respondent
OPINION
Before GARFF, BENCH and
JACKSON, JJ.
BENCH, Judge:
Appellant Robert E. Gorrell challenges
the judgment of a trial court finding a cash
asset to be solely an asset of his decedentwife's estate. We reverse.
Katherine Wentland Gorrell, appellant's
wife, passed away May 4, 1984 at the age
of 80 and after over 22 years of marriage
to appellant Later that day, while rearranging cupboards in the kitchen, appellant
discovered a heartshaped beauty box hidden in a roasting pan. Inside the beauty
box he found approximately $43,700.00 in
mostly small bills. Prior to this discovery,
appellant had no knowledge of the existence of this money.
Appellant contacted the local branch of
First Security Bank of Utah, the personal
representative of his wife's estate, and informed the bank of his discovery. He later
deposited the money in his account at the
same bank.

The bank filed a petition with the Sec
Judicial District Court of Weber Count
recover the money as solely an asse
decedent's estate. Concurrent with the
tition, the bank placed a freeze on aj
lant's account. By the time the acc<
was frozen, only about $5,000.00 remai
After a hearing on August 9, 1984, the
court issued an order restraining appel
from disposing of any of decedent's as
currently in his possession. The court
for trial the matter of proper ownershi
the cash.
Trial was held February 5, 1985. A\
lant and decedent's daughter from a p
marriage testified concerning the ean
capacity and financial background of aj
lant and decedent. The court placed
burden on appellant of proving owner
of the money and found three poss
sources of the money: 1) solely appella
assets, 2) the combined assets of appel
and decedent, or 3) solely decedent's ass
The court held appellant failed to prove
cash was comprised in whole or in par
money contributed by him, and, therei
entered judgment for the bank. The c
ordered appellant immediately to turn <
the unused portion of the money and nc
dispose of any of the assets purchased i
the discovered money.
On appeal, appellant argues the coi
finding of ownership was clearly aga
the weight of the evidence and the c
erred in placing the burden of prool
him. Similar arguments, were made
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. h
29 Utah 2d 24, 504 P.2d 995 (1972) an
In re Estate ofBickford, 74 Ill.App.2d
219 N.E.2d 159 (1966).
In Hall, plaintiff bank, administrate
defendant's parents' estates, initiate
proceeding against defendant to rec<
proceeds from the sale of stock certific
in defendant's possession allegedly bel<
ing to one or the other of the este
During his lifetime, defendant's fa
owned stock certificates representing
proximately 5,500 shares in a mining c
pany. Defendant claimed her father n
a gift of the certificates to her mot
who, in turn, made a gift of them to
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fendant. In 1969, the market value of the
stock increased significantly. Defendant
effected a transfer of the shares on the
books of the corporation by supplying a
bond and thereafter sold the shares. At
trial, the sole issue was whether or not
defendant had acquired ownership of the
shares of stock by way of gift. Evidence
at trial showed defendant's father did not
sign the assignment and transfer contained
on the reverse side of each stock certificate. Furthermore, the certificates remained in the name of defendant's father
on the records of the corporation during
both parents' lifetimes. The trial court
concluded defendant had failed to prove a
gift by clear and convincing evidence, and
entered judgment for plaintiff. On appeal
defendant argued the trial court erred in
imposing the burden of proof of ownership
on her. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court and held defendant had the
burden of proving ownership, in view of
the name on the stock certificates and the
absence of transfer endorsements. Hall,
504 P.2d at 996. From that holding, it is
apparent that once plaintiff had made a
prima facie case of ownership, the burden
of proof shifted to defendant.
The mechanics of this standard were
more clearly articulated in the Bickford
case. In Bickford, the administratrix of
decedent's estate initiated a proceeding
against respondent, decedent's son, to recover certain assets in respondent's possession allegedly belonging to the estate. One
of the contested assets was $2,507.00 in
cash discovered, after decedent's death, in
the pocket of her dress located in a storeroom of her house. At trial, witnesses for
petitioner-administratrix testified decedent
owned the home in which she lived. She
had operated a restaurant for twelve years
prior to her death but, due to ill health, was
hospitalized for the three months immediately preceding. Decedent kept all her receipts and business papers in the storeroom. Respondent testified he lived with
decedent most of his life including the period of his marriage. He helped his mother
in the restaurant which, he testified, was
unprofitable for some time prior to her
death. Respondent claimed the money con-

sisted of gifts from his father and grandfather which he had delivered to his mother
for safekeeping. Respondent had not been
employed regularly for eight years.
The trial court entered judgment for petitioner and respondent appealed. The Appellate Court of Illinois held, "The burden
of persuasion remains with petitioner but
when petitioner has presented a prima facie
case of ownership by the decedent the burden of establishing ownership in himself
shifts to respondent." 219 N.E.2d at 161.
In affirming the trial court for failure of
respondent to sustain his burden of proof,
the Appellate Court went on to establish
criteria for assessing what constitutes a
prima facie case of ownership. The Court
held as follows:
The evidence shows clearly that the money involved was in the pocket of a dress
owned by decedent and in her control
until the time of her removal to the hospital. There is no evidence showing any
change in control at that time or from
that time to the date of death. In our
opinion, this establishes the element of
possession in decedent at the time of
death rather than in Respondent and
when considered with the other evidence amply presents a prima facie
case of ownership of such money by
decedent This being the case, the burden was on Respondent to show by what
right he claimed ownership. The facts
which Respondent claims support his
ownership of the money are disputed in
practically every material respect
Id. (Emphasis added.) The "other evidence" which amply presented a prima facie case of ownership of the cash in that
case included decedent's exclusive ownership of the dress in which the cash was
found, decedent's income through her own
business, and the absence of contributions
to household income by respondent
In the instant case, the trial court incorrectly placed the burden of proof on appellant since the bank failed to establish a
prima facie case of ownership. The bank
established only that decedent owned the
home in which the couple lived and that
appellant had no prior knowledge of the
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hidden cash. No liother evidence" suffc
cient to establish a prima facie case of
ownership was presented. On the contrary, appellant and decedent lived together in decedent's home for over 22 years.
There was also no evidence the roasting
pan in which the money was found was
owned exclusively by decedent. Decedent
worked for only three to four years after
the marriage and then retired, receiving
approximately $225.00 per month in social
security. Appellant, however, made significant financial contributions to the marriage. He worked full time for most of the
marriage and delivered all of his income to
decedent who handled the family finances.
Under those circumstances, there being no
prima facie case of ownership by the bank,
it was error for the court to impose on
appellant the burden of proving ownership
of the cash.
We therefore reverse the judgment below. Costs to appellant
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur.

Ben K. HOOPIIAINA, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
•.

INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE,
dba, LDS Hospital, and Jane Doe,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 86007&-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 27, 1987.
Medical malpractice action was
brought against hospital and hospital
moved for summary judgment The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E,
Conder, J., granted hospital summary judgment and appeal was taken. The Court ot
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that in ab-

sence of expert to testify for plaintiff that
quinidine mistakenly administered to him
harmed him, there was no evidence upon
which finding of liability against hospital
could lie.
Affirmed.

1. Hospitals «=>8
In medical malpractice actions, plaintiff must provide expert testimony to establish standard of care, hospital's failure to
comply with that standard, that hospital
caused plaintiffs injury, and any issues of
fact which are outside knowledge and experience of lay persons.
2. Hospitals e»8
Inasmuch as hospital admitted that its
employee mistakenly administered single
20b-mi))igram tablet of quinidine to plaintiff, hospital's breach of standard of care
was admitted without requiring expert testimony, so that only issues remaining for
jury were whether injury existed and
whether quinidine caused plaintiffs injury.
3. Hospitals e=>8
In absence of expert to testify for
plaintiff that quinidine mistakenly administered to plaintiff by hospital employee
harmed plaintiff, or that more than single
200-milligram tablet was administered,
plaintiff could not prove injury existed or
that quinidine caused injury, for purpose of
maintaining medical malpractice action
against hospital.
4. Pretrial Procedure «=>40
Trial court did not err in denying medical malpractice plaintiffs motion to compel
hospital to provide answers to interrogatories concerning name and address of patient who should have received quinidine
mistakenly administered to plaintiff, under
State Department of Health, Hospital and
Psychiatric Hospital Rules and Regulations, requiring confidentiality of patient
information. U.OA.1953, 78-25-25.

Matt Biljanic, Midvale, for plaintiff and
appellant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-OOOooIn the matter of the Estate of
Katherine Wentland Gorrell,
ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Deceased,
v.
Robert E. Gorrell,

Case No. 860113-CA

Appellant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Respondent's
Petition for Rehearing in the abbve captioned matter, and the Court
having duly considered said petition,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's Petition for
Rehearing be denied.
Dated this 10th day of September, 1987.
FOR THE COURT:

Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING by depositing the
same in the United States mail# postage prepaid to the following:

Pete N. Vlahos
Vlahos & Sharp
Attorney at Law
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Michael J. Glasmann
Attorney at Law
1000 First Security Bldg.
Ogden, UT 84401
DATED thislOth day of September, 1987,

Karen Bean
Case Management Clerk
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Amado B. GARCIA, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief of Drivers License Division, State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 17559.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 1, 1982.
Motorist appealed from an order of the
Second District Court, Davis County, Douglas L. Cornaby, J., affirming the Department of Public Safety's administrative revocation of his driving privileges under the
implied consent statute. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that where the
motorist occupied the driver's position be*hind the steering wheel of an automobile,
with possession of the ignition key and with
the apparent ability to start and move the
vehicle, he had "actual physical control"
under the implied consent statute, even
though he might have been prevented from
moving the vehicle by a fence in front and a
parked car in the rear.
Affirmed.
1. Automobiles &=>1U2(9, 10)
Showing that arresting officer had
grounds to believe that person was in physical control of vehicle is not by itself sufficient to support administrative license revocation for refusal to submit to blood test,
but Department of Public Safety must
show that operator was in actual physical
control of motor vehicle in addition to showing that arresting officer had grounds to
believe that operator was then under influence of alcohol; same burdens must be met
in district court de novo review. U.C.A.
1953, 41-6-44.10(b).
2. Automobiles <s=>144.2(10)
In contrast to prosecutions under criminal statutes, driver's license revocation proceeding requires proof only by preponder-

ance of evidence and not beyond reasonable
doubt. U.C.A.1953, 41-6^4 10(b)
3. Appeal and Error <s=> 1009(1, 4)
Standard for appellate review of factual findings affords great deference to trial
court's view of evidence unless trial court
has misapplied law or its findings are clearly against weight of evidence.
4. Automobiles <s=» 144.1(1)
"Actual physical control" language of
implied consent statute should be read as
intending to prevent intoxicated drivers
from entering their vehicles except as passengers or passive occupants. U.C.A.1953,
41-4-44.10(a).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Automobiles <s=» 144.1(1)
Where motorist occupied driver's position behind steering wheel of automobile,
with possession of ignition key and with
apparent ability to start and move vehicle,
he had "actual physical control" under implied consent statute, even though he might
have been prevented from moving vehicle
by fence in front and parked caHn rear.
U.C.A.1953, 41-&-44.10(a).
6. Automobiles <&=» 144.1(1)
Fact that motorist occupying driver's
position in automobile might be physically
obstructed from driving away does not preclude license revocation under implied consent statute. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(a).
7. Automobiles <$=> 144.2(9)
To obtain license revocation under implied consent statute^ Department of Public
Safety need not show that motorist actually
intended to exert "actual physical control"
over vehicle. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(a).

Richard W. Brann, Ogden, for plaintiff
and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M.
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
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DURHAM, Justice:
After a trial de novo, the district court
affirmed the defendant's administrative
revocation of plaintiff Garcia's driving privileges. Plaintiff appeals from the district
court decision and contends that there was
insufficient evidence to support the district
court's finding that he was in "actual physical control of a motor vehicle" as contemplated by the Utah implied consent statute.
At 6:00 p. m. on November 1, 1980, Officer Gerald Ecker responded to a disturbance complaint at an apartment complex
in Sunset, Utah. When he arrived at the
complex, Officer Ecker was met by a Mr.
Varble, who had positioned his own vehicle
behind the automobile of the plaintiff to
prevent the plaintiff from backing out of
his parking stall. A fence was located approximately three feet in front of the plaintiffs car. Officer Ecker testified that as he
approached the Garcia vehicle, he observed
the plaintiff alone in the vehicle behind the
steering wheel in the "process of starting
his motor vehicle" by attempting to turn on
the ignition; the officer testified that he
saw the keys in the ignition. While there
was some dispute about whether or not the
key was actually in the ignition, the district
court found it "believable that the plaintiff
had the keys in the ignition," and it is not
disputed that he had the ignition key in his
exclusive possession. Officer Ecker observed that plaintiff was apparently under
the influence of alcohol. A second police
officer, Officer Gale, arrived at the scene,
obtained the keys from the plaintiff and,
after interviewing Officer Ecker and Mr.
Varble, placed the plaintiff under arrest for
being in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol.
The plaintiff refused to permit chemical
tests of his blood or breath, and consequently received a one-year revocation of his
driver's license after an administrative
hearing by the Department of Public Safety
pursuant to the authority of the Utah implied consent statute, § 41-6-44.10, Utah
Code Ann. (1953). This statute provides for
revocation of a person's driver's license
when he refuses to submit to chemical tests

of his blood, breath or urine "for the purpose of determining whether he was driving
or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol." The statute's enforcement provision,
§ 41-£-44.10(b) U.C.A., requires that the
arresting officer have reasonable grounds
to believe that the arrested person has been
driving or is in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol.
[1] The defendant argues that a showing that the arresting officer had grounds
to believe the person was in physical control
of a vehicle is by itself sufficient to support
an administrative license revocation. We
disagree. This Court has previously recognized two separate evidentiary burdens to
be borne by the Department of Public Safety in a revocation proceeding. The department must show that an operator was "in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle"
in addition to showing that the arresting
officer had grounds to believe that the operator was then under the influence of alcohol. Ballard v. State, Utah, 595 P.2d 1302
(1979).
[2] The same burdens must be met in
the district court. The district court's jurisdiction, conferred by § 41-6-44.10(b)
U.C.A., is limited to a trial de novo "to
determine whether the petitioner's license is
subject to revocation under the provisions
of this act." In Ballard, supra, we characterized the trial de novo as "civil and administrative, the purpose of which is for the
protection of the public." 595 P.2d at 1304.
In contrast to prosecutions under criminal
statutes, a license revocation proceeding requires proof only by a preponderance of the
evidence and not beyond a reasonable
doubt. Since all other matters were resolved by stipulation, the single issue before
the district court, and now before us, is
whether the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
was "in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle" as contemplated by the implied
consent statute.
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[3] The district court found "from the
totality of the facts and the circumstances
that the [plaintiff] had actual physical control of the vehicle as required by the Implied Consent Statute." The standard for
appellate review of factual findings affords
great deference to the trial court's view of
the evidence unless the trial court has misapplied the law or its findings are clearly
against the weight of the evidence. Pagan0 v. Walker, Utah, 639 P.2d 452 (1975);
Reed v. Alvey, Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980).
The meaning of "actual physical control"
is suggested by the structure of § 41-G-44.10(a), which reads:
Any person operating a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical test or tests . ..
for the purpose of determining whether
he was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol . . . .
[Emphasis
added.]
The use of the disjunctive "or" strongly
suggests an intent to proscribe conduct beyond and different from driving or operating a moving vehicle.1 Thus, the standard
in Utah for determining whether a person
was "in actual physical control" of a vehicle
is different from the standard used in
states which have only "driving" or "operating" language in their statutes. State v.
Duly, 64 N.J. 122, 313 A.2d 194 (1973), for
example, relied upon by plaintiff, was decided under a criminal statute with "operating" language and is not persuasive in this
case. Of greater value is the case of State
v. Ruona, Mont., 321 P.2d 615 (1958), in
which the Montana Supreme Court, following an earlier Ohio case, construed a criminal statute with the phrase "drive or be in
actual physical control," and adopted the
view that:
the statute defined two distinct offenses, in "operating a vehicle," and "being in actual physical control of a vehicle"
while intoxicated.
*• As of 1967, § 41-6-44.10(a) U.C.A. simply
stated that "any person operating a motor vehicle" was deemed to have given his consent to
chemical tests. In 1969, a new subparagraph
(b) was enacted which referred to tests "for the
purpose of determining whether he was driving

321 P.2d at 618, This conclusion was likewise reached in Walker v. State, Okl.Cr.,
424 P.2d 1001 (1967), where the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the use
of the disjunctive in Oklahoma's statute
resulted in two offenses, one being "to
drive or operate" and the other being "to be
in actual physical control" of a motor vehicle. The language of Utah's implied consent statute requires the same construction.
A definition of "actual physical control"
is contained in State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d
404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971). The statute in
question there was § 41-6-44, which made
it unlawful for any person under the influence of intoxicating liquor "to drive or be in
actual physical control of any vehicle within
this state." In Bugger, the defendant was
found asleep in his car, which was completely off the traveled portion of the highway;
the motor was not running. This Court
held that there was no afctual physical control of the vehicle. "Actual physical control" was defined in its ordinary sense to
mean "present bodily restraint, directing
influence, domination or regulation." 483
P.2d at 443. The Court found, on these
facts, that the defendant was "not controlling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any
dominion over it." Id.
Acts short of starting the motor have
been held to constitute actual physical control in other jurisdictions. In Hughes v.
State, Okl.Cr., 535 P.2d 1023 (1975), the
court found a defendant to have been in
actual physical control of a vehicle when
the vehicle was found improperly parked in
a residential area. The defendant was in
the front seat, the ignition key was in the
ignition, and the motor was turned off.
The court said:
It is our opinion that the legislature, in
making it a crime to be in "actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor," inor was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle under the influence ...," which is the
same language found in the current statute.
Thus, the Legislature appears to have deliberately expanded the scope of the statute's coverage.
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tended to enable the drunken driver to be
apprehended before he strikes . . . .
*
*
*
*
*
*
We believe that an intoxicated person
seated behind the steering wheel of a
motor vehicle is a threat to the safety
and welfare of the public. The danger is
less than when the intoxicated person is
actually driving a vehicle, but it does
exist. The defendant when arrested may
have been exercising no conscious volition
with regard to the vehicle, still there is a
legitimate inference to be drawn that he
placed himself behind the wheel of the
vehicle and could have at any time started the automobile and driven away.
535 P.2d at 1024. The same public policy
concern for prevention compelled a similar
result in City of Cincinnati v. Kelley, 47
Ohio St.2d 94,1 Ohio Ops. 56, 351 N.E.2d 85
(1976). In that case an intoxicated motorist
seated in the driver's seat of a legally
parked car with his hands on the steering
wheel and the keys in the ignition was
found to be in actual physical control of his
vehicle, even though the engine was off.
The court held that the relevant city ordinance provided for two separate offenses, in
that it prohibited "operating or being in
'actual physical control' of a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol." (Emphasis
in original.) From that initial premise, the
court concluded that it should interpret the
"control" offense in light of the apparent
legislative purpose in defining an offense
separate from "operating."
The clear purpose of the control aspect of
the instant ordinance is to deter persons
from being found under circumstances in
which they can directly commence operating a vehicle while they are under the
influence of alcohol . . . .
*
*
*
*
*
*

(T]he term "actual physical control," <a
employed in the subject ordinance, i 3
quires that a person be in the driver!
seat of a vehicle, behind the steering
wheel, in possession of the ignition keyl
and in such condition that he is physicallw
capable of starting the engine jtnJ.
causing the vehicle to move.
351 N.E.2d at 87. That a preventive pur]
pose should be read into the "actual physil
cal control" language is the opinion of &
substantial majority of the jurisdictions in!
terpreting similar statutory language.2
In a recent case, State v. Juncewskjl
Minn., 308 N.W.2d 316 (1981), the Supremj
Court of Minnesota held that a defendant
who had been found inside a pickup truck!
seated behind and leaning against the steer!
ing wheel was in "actual physical control]]
of the vehicle. While there was uncertain^
ty as to whether the motor was running!
the court held that "[w]hether a motor!
must be running before a person may be 1 ^
actual physical control is essentially a poliqfi
issue." 308 N.W.2d at 320.
j | |
[4,5] As a matter of public policy ana
statutory construction, we believe that $i
"actual physical control" language ^pt
Utah's implied consent statute should |»J
read as intending to prevent intoxicated,
drivers from entering their vehicles except
as passengers or passive occupants as in
Bugger, supra. Therefore, under the facts
before us, where a motorist occupied the
driver's position behind the steering wheeV
with possession of the ignition key and with
the apparent ability to start and move the
vehicle,3 we hold that there has been in
adequate showing of "actual physical cbhtrol" under our implied consent statute/ ' j

2. See, e.g., State v. Ghylin% N.D., 250 N.W.2d 3. The testimony of Officer Ecker was that
252 (1977) (purpose of statute to deter intoxiplaintiff had the key in the ignition and 4<was to
cated persons from getting into their vehicle
the process of starting his motor vehicle." He
except as passengers); State v. Beckey, 291 later expressed the view that the plaintiff was
Minn. 483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971) (purpose of
having trouble doing so because of the degree
implied consent law to aid enforcement of
of his intoxication, but nothing in the record
criminal drunk driving statute); State v. Hal- warrants a finding that the plaintiff was physivorson, Minn., 181 N.W.2d 473 (1970) (purpose
cally unable to start the car, as would be the
to promote traffic safety); State v. Schuler, case with an unconscious or sleeping motorist
N.D., 243 N.W.2d 367 (1976) (purpose of "actual physical control** statute is preventive).
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[6] That the plaintiff might have been
revented from moving his vehicle by the
>nce in front and the parked car of Mr.
arble in the rear does not alter our concluon. In that respect, our decision comports
ith cases from other jurisdictions in which
iere was a physical obstacle preventing
tual movement of the vehicle, but the
urts nonetheless found actual physical
ntrol.4 The record in this case demonrates that plaintiff's automobile could
ve traveled at least a few feet if it had
en put into operation.
[7] Similarly, we find it unnecessary for
e department to show actual intent under
e control provisions of the implied consent
ttute. Just as an intent to drive is inred from one's actual driving, so also
ty an intent to control a vehicle be inTed from the performance of those acts
ich we have held to constitute actual
ysical control.
The decision of the district court is afTied.

IALL, C. J., and STEWART, OAKS and
WE, JJ., concur.

?ord WILSON and Marilee W. Wilson,
et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
n B. MANNING, City Recorder, City
of Fruit Heights, Defendant and
Respondent
No. 17632.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 1, 1982.
Petitioners brought action for a writ of
iamus commanding a city recorder to
?e, e g., State v. Dunbany, 184 Neb. 337, 167
^.2d 556 (1969), State v. Schuler, N.D., 243

submit a rezoning ordinance to a referendum. The Second District Court, Davis
County, Thornley K. Swan, J., denied the
petition, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court held that an unsigned minute
entry did not constitute an entry of judgment, nor was it final judgment for purposes of applicable rules governing appeals.
Appeal dismissed.

Appeal and Error <s=>78(l)
An unsigned minute entry denying petition for writ of mandamus did not constitute an entry of judgment, nor was it final
judgment for purposes of applicable rules
governing appeals. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules
58A(b, c), 72(a).

Curtis J. Drake, Salt Lake pity, for plaintiffs and appellants.
D. Kent Norton, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners brought this action for a writ
of mandamus commanding a city recorder
to submit a rezoning ordinance to a referendum. The district court denied the petition
in an unsigned minute entry accompanied
by a certificate of mailing which directed
counsel for the defendant to prepare an
order conforming to the minute entry.
However, no order appears in the record
and apparently none was entered. The notice of appeal states that petitioners appeal
"from the minute entry entered in this action . . . . "
An unsigned minute entry does not constitute an entry of judgment, nor is it a
final judgment for purposes of Utah
R.Civ.P. 72(a). Utah R.Civ.P. 58A(b) and
(c); Steadman v. Lake Hills, 20 Utah 2d 61,
433 P.2d 1 (1967); Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135
N.W.2d 367 (1976).
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29 Utah 2d 24
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N. A.,
as administrator of the Estates of George
Hatton Buckley and Pearl Murdock Buckley, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

F|RST

Lucille Buckley HALL and Harold E. Hall,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 12837.

Supremo Court of Utah.
Dee. 28, 1972.

Action by administrator of estates of
deceased father and mother to recover from
daughter certain stock certificates or proceeds from sale thereof. The Fourth District Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif,
J., entered judgment for plaintiff and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court,
Tuckett, J., held that daughter, who had
effected transfer of shares on books of
corporation by supplying bond, had burden
of showing that the shares, which had
been carried on books of corporation in
name of father who had not executed stock
transfer endorsements, had been given by
father to mother and later by mother to
daughter.
Affirmed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.

1. Gifts €=>47(l)

In action by administrator of estates
of deceased father and mother to recover
from daughter stock certificates or proceeds from sale thereof, daughter, who had
effected transfer of shares on books of
corporation by supplying bond, had burden
of showing that the shares, which had
been carried on books of corporation in
name of father who had not executed stock
transfer endorsements, had been given by
father to mother and later by mother to
daughter.
2. Appeal and Error <£=>I008.I(I), 1012.1(4)

The Supreme Court will not disturb
findings of trial court unless court has misapplied proven facts or made findings
clearly against weight of the evidence.

3. Executors and Administrators C=^59
Gifts <§=>49(6)

In action by administrator of estates of
deceased father and mother to recover from
daughter stock certificates, or proceeds
from sale thereof, which administrator
claimed to be assets of one or other of the
estates, wherein daughter claimed that, after death of father, de facto distribution
of his estate was made by mother and children, that mother had accepted the certificates as part of her share of estate and subsequently gave them to daughter, e\ idence
was insufficient to show that mother had
received the shares as part of that de facto
distribution.

J. Rulon Morgan, Frank J. Allen, Clyde,
Mecham & Pratt, Salt Lake City, for defendants-appellants.
Glen J. Ellis, Maxfield, Gammon, Ellis
& McGuire, Provo, for plaintiff-respondent.
T U C K E T T , Justice:
The plaintiff as administrator initiated
these proceedings in the court below seeking to recover from the defendant Lucille
Buckley Hall certain stock certificates or
the proceeds from the sale thereof which
it claims to be assets of one or other of
the estates being administered upon. The
defendant Lucille Buckley Hall claimed
ownership of the shares by an inter vivos
gift from her mother Pearl Murdock Buckley. During his lifetime George Hatton
Buckley owned certain stock certificates
representing approximately 5500 shares of
stock in the Mercur Dome Gold Mining
Company. The defendant Lucille Buckley
Hall claims that prior to his death her
father George Hatton Buckley made a gift
of the stock certificates to her mother
Pearl Murdock Buckley who thereafter
kept the certificates in a black box which
also contained other papers and records.
The decedent George Hatton Buckley did
not sign the assignment and transfer contained on the reverse side of each stock certificate and the certificates remained in the
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name of George Hatton Buckley on the records of the corporation during the lifetimes
of George Hatton Buckley and his wife
Pearl Murdock Buckley. During the year
1969 the market value of the stock in question increased sharply and the defendant
who had possession of the certificates effected a transfer of the shares on the books
of the corporation by supplying a bond and
thereafter sold the shares.
The parties proceeded to trial in the
court below on the issue of whether or not
the defendant had acquired ownership of
the shares of stock by reason of a gift
from the defendant's father to the defendant's mother and in turn a gift from the defendant's mother to the defendant. On
conflicting testimony the trial court found
that the defendant had failed to prove a
gift by clear and convincing evidence from
her father to her mother. The court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to
judgment in an amount equal to the net
proceeds on the sale of the stock by the
defendant and also that the plaintiff was
entitled to possession of a stock certificate
not included in the sale.
[1, 2] On appeal the defendant contends
that the trial court erred in imposing upon
the defendant the burden of proving her
ownership of the shares of stock in question by way of a gift by clear and convincing evidence. It would appear to us
that the defendant having acquired possession of the stock certificates which were
carried on the books of the corporation in
the name of the decedent George H.
Buckley, and George H. Buckley not having executed the stock transfer endorsements which were a part of each certificate,
the defendant did in fact have the burden
of establishing her ownership by gift by
clear and convincing proof.1 As this court
has stated in numerous prior decisions we
will not disturb the finding of the trial
court unless that court has misapplied
I. Jones v. Cook, 118 Utah 562, 223 P.2d
423; Raleigh v. Wells, 29 Utah 217, 81 P.
908; Christensen v. Ogden State Bank,
75 Utah 478, 286 P. 638; Greener v.
Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194.

proven facts or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence."'
[3] As a second claim of error on the
part of the trial court, the defendant claims
that after the death of George Hatton
Buckley a de facto distribution of his
estate was made by his widow and children
at which time various items of personal
property belonging to the decedent were
given to the widow and children. Defendant claims that the mother Pearl Murdock
Buckley accepted the certificates of shares
as a part of her share of the estate. The
court below found that the evidence was insufficient to show that Pearl Murdock
Buckley received the shares of stock as a
part of that de facto distribution.
It is quite clear that the money and
shares of stock when in the hands of administrator should be distributed as assets
of the estate of George Hatton Buckley.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to costs.
CALLISTER, C. J., and H E N R I O D and
CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
E L L E T T , Justice (dissenting):
I dissent.
The evidence without
contradiction
shows that George Buckley gave the stock
to his wife, Pearl Murdock Buckley, in
1945. Apparently the trial judge elected
not to believe the disinterested witnesses
but instead based his opinion on what he
must have conceived to be a rule of law.
In his memorandum decision he stated:
[T]he Court finds and concludes that defendant has failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the
decedent, George Hatton Buckley, made
a gift to Pearl Murdock Buckley of the
stock certificates in that he failed to
endorse the stock certificates in November of 1945 ZL'hen he purportedly de2. Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P.
2d 465.
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tlaicd he 7ici, l/r,nq same to Pearl Murdoch BHCUC\ and h,s failutc to dtvest
lumsclf of tlu f,h,suai
control
of
fhe
idtificatcs
at the time the purported
deductions of t„ft Kcrc madc
[ E m ha.
MS added ]
In the case o» J d > ] 0 r v Daynes, 118
L t a h 6 1 , 218 V2<\ 1069 (1950), th.s court
held that a sale of stock was made on July
21, 1947, althoii K h the stock certificate was
not signed until 1 dmiar>, 1948 In deciding the matt<r, t h i s c o „ r t quoted from
the case of Joins v Commercial Investment Trust, 64 U » h 151, 228 P. 896 as
:ollo«s
"If thc> i n tend the title to be
transferred when the contract is made
it ,s a contract of sale, otherwise it is a
contract to sell "
If

^ e B l «*ley handed the stock to
his wife, as the witnesses said he did, and
at the time intended to give it to her, the
gift was completed to the extent that she
uould have the eqtntable title to it, which
uould be good against all the world, and
this is true even though the stock was not
endorsed and was thereafter kept in a
box to which George had access
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In his deposition which was read Gerald
Buckle> also testified
Q But \ou made no claim to the
stock ?
A It was mom's stock
\ppellant testified with reference to the
assets of George Buckle} as follows
Q What was done with respect to the
war bonds and the old car? What was
done with the old car and the bonds?
A M} brother Bert sold the car And
the war bonds and that was my mother's
Q Was there any other property in
the estate, that you know of?
A

Just my dad's ring

Q

Who got the ring?

A

Gerald

Geor

George Buckle* was injured, and from
1931 to his death he was a semi-invalid
and unable to work H 1S W1fe, Pearl Murdock Buckle}, worked as a janitress to support the famib
They were poor, and
uhen George died ,n 1950, the only assets
he left were a small bank account, a ring,
an old car, a feu u . i r bonds, and plaintiff
bairns the stock m question which he had
acquired while working the mine
The
stock at that tnm was worthless as an
asset
Gerald Buckle} testified for the plaintiff
regarding the piopert> which his father,
>eorge Buckle}, had left
Q There was a division among the
family of > 0 u r father's estate without
probate proceedings?
A I didn't know of any division of
m> dad's propcrt\
Q

Utah

Well, who got the property, then?

V Well, just mother had it.

The testimony was uncontradicted that
Pearl Murdock Buckley gave the worthless
stock to appellant sometime during 1960
Although the stock in question was
worthless, George Buckley always claimed
that someday it might become valuable and
it should be saved
His son Gerald had
some of the same stock, and the father
told him to hold onto it and pay the assessments, as it might become valuable
George's belief seemed prophetic, and in
1969 the stock in question was sold for
$25,000
For 19 years after his death neither of
the sons of George Buckley made any
claim to the stock in question In fact, in
1968 Gerald Buckley told appellant to
sell it and even signed a bond so she could
have the stock transferred to her own name
in order to sell it without probating the
estate of their parents
The plaintiff in its complaint shows that
this matter is an attempt to get appellant to
divide what she received from the sale of
the stock with the other two heirs and is
not a bona fide probate of the estate.
Paragraph 8 of the complaint reads:
That demand has been made upon the
Defendant Lucille Buckley Hall by the
other heirs and by the Administrator ap-

998

Utah

504 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

pointed herein and that she has failed,
neglected or refused to deliver to the other heirs their respective shares of the
Estates.
It does not appear that any effort has
been made by the administrator to collect from the other heirs the property which
they received after the death of their
father or mother.
There is another matter not urged by
appellant which should require a reversal
of the judgment in this case. It involves
the jurisdiction of the court to appoint
the plaintiff as administrator of the two
estates jointly, and we should notice matters of jurisdiction whenever we are aware
of them whether urged or not. If we ignore the matter now, we would simply
make for other lawsuits, for if the administrator is not lawfully appointed, its acts
are void and subject to collateral attack.
The complaint states that plaintiff is
the administrator of the estates of George
Hatton Buckley and Pearl Murdock Buckley; that there are three heirs; that the
stock in question constitutes a part of the
estate of George Hatton Buckley; and that
the heirs are entitled to one-third equal
share.
The probating of estates of deceased persons is purely statutory, and unless done
according to the statute, the attempt to
probate is a nullity. Section 75-4-6, U.C.
A. 1953, provides for letters of administration upon several estates jointly under two
conditions:
(1) Where the estate of one deceased
person has descended from another deceased person whose estate has never been
probated, or

question arises: Did all of the estate of
Mrs. Buckley descend from Mr. Buckley?
In its complaint plaintiff says the shares
of stock constituted "a major portion of
the estates of George Hatton Buckley and
possibly that of Pearl Murdock Buckley."
It thus appears that each estate had other
assets.
In order for the two estates to be probated jointly under the provision of the
statute, it is necessary that all of the estate
of Mrs. Buckley be received from the estate
of her deceased husband. 1 If in fact the
stock never left George's estate, as the
trial court held, then a probate of George's
estate would give one-third to Pearl Murdock Buckley and two-ninths to each of
the three children. 2 If then Pearl gave
the stock to appellant, as the undisputed
evidence shows, then appellant would get
five-ninths of the stock and her two brothers only two-ninths each. The trial judge
made no finding as to whether Pearl gave
to appellant the one-third interest which descended to her, holding it had no legal
consequences. If Mrs. Buckley gave to appellant all of her interest in the stock,
there would be nothing to probate in her
estate, which plaintiff claims descended to
her from the estate of her husband.
It is, therefore, necessary to determine
whether Pearl gave her one-third interest
to appellant, and the court erred in holding
that whether or not the gift was made was
of no legal consequence.
Since the complaint shows that the estates could not be probated jointly, the
plaintiff has no standing to maintain this
action.

(2) Where two or more deceased persons
held property as tenants in common, etc.

I would reverse the judgment and remand the case with directions to dismiss
the action. I would award costs to the appellant.

Obviously these two estates cannot be
jointly probated under (2) above, for it is
not claimed that Mr. and Mrs. Buckley
held anything as tenants in common. The

At least the case
a determination of
not Pearl Murdock
of the stock to the

I. In re Martin Estates, 109 Utah 131, 166
P.2d 197 (1946).

2. Section 74-4-5(1), U.C.A.1953.

should be remanded for
the issue of whether or
Buckley gave her share
appellant.
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the declarations were made fairly and in ordinary course of life, can be considered in
determining whether deed was delivered
with intent to presently pass title.*

Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct 14, 1939.
1. Appeal and error <§=>I009(3)

In equity case findings of trial court on
conflicting evidence will not be set aside unless it manifestly appears that the court has
misapplied proven facts or made findings
clearly against the weight of the evidence.!

7. Deeds <©=>208(l)

In quiet title action involving question
whether testator had delivered deed to widow with intent to presently pass title, evidence sustained trial court's finding that
deed had not been delivered with such intent even if widow had been permitted to
testify as to the manual delivery of the
deed. Rev.St.1933, 104-49-2.

2. Deeds <S=>208(3)

In quiet title action involving issue
whether testator had delivered deed to widow, widow's testimony that she saw testator
removing deed from his pocket, that he remarked that he had present for her and
handed deed to her requesting that deed be
not recorded until after his death* and that
thereafter deed remained in her possession,
justified inference that deed was delivered
and was prima facie sufficient for that purpose, but such inference was not conclusive.

Appeal from Second District Court,
Weber County; E. E. Pratt, Judge.
Action to quiet title by Lily E. Stanley,
executrix of the last will and testament of
Willis O. Stanley, deceased, against Emily
C. Stanley. Judgment for plaintiff, and
defendant appeals.
Affirmed.

DeVine, Howell & Stine and Neil R.
3. Deeds &=> 194(2)
Olmstead, all of Ogden, for appellant.
Presumption of delivery arising from
Thatcher & Young and Valentine Gidgrantee's possession of deed was not conclu- eon, all of Ogden, for respondent
sive.

4. Evidence <§=?269(2)
In quiet title action involving question
whether testator had delivered deed to his
widow with intent to pass title, testator's
statement after alleged delivery that he
was owner of property was admissible only
upon question of intent to presently pass
title if in fact there had been a manual delivery.
5. Deeds ©=>56(2)
"Delivery" of a deed is essentially a
matter of intent which intent is to be arrived at from all facts and surrounding circumstances.
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of
"Deliver; Delivery," eee Words & Phrases.]
6. Evidence €=>269(3)
Declarations of grantor before and after
date of deed, at least where it appears that
1 Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214
P. 313; Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah
45, 57 P. 712; Singleton v. Kelly, 61
Utah 277, 212 P. 63, 66; Holman v.
Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 457;
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d
94 P.2d—30

EVANS, District Judge.
This is an action to quiet title to certain premises in Ogden, Utah, and designated as 823 and 825 Twenty-Fifth Street.
Willis O. Stanley died on November 17,
1937, leaving as his survivors the defendant, his widow, and George C. Stanley and
Lucile Stanley, children by adoption.
Willis 0 . Stanley will be hereafter referred to as the testator. He and the defendant had been married some fifty years prior to his death and had lived together until 1932, at which time they separated.
The testator had for many years been employed as a travelling salesman on a salary of $250 per month, one-half of which
he regularly remitted to the defendant,
which, together with rentals received from
properties acquired during the marriage,
she deposited in the bank as a joint account. Of the various properties acquired,
all were taken in the name of the defend513, 101 A.L.R. 532; Wilcox v. Cloward,
88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1; Hoyt v. Upper
Marion Ditch Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P.2d
234.
2 Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228
P. 911.
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ant, except the property here in question,
which stood on the records in the name
of the testator. All living expenses and
all expenses incident to the upkeep of these
properties were paid from this joint account by checks drawn by the defendant,
who assumed the general management of
the properties because of the testator's frequent absences from home. Sometime after 1929 the defendant closed this joint account and opened an account in her own
name which Was, however, handled in the
same way as had been the joint account.
In the year 1906, the testator executed
a deed conveying the premises in question
to the defendant. This deed was recorded three months after the death of the testator. The plaintiff, while admitting the
execution of the deed, contends that it was
never delivered. The defendant, on the
other hand, contends and offered evidence
to support her contention that the deed was
delivered. The trial court found the issues
in favor of the plaintiff upon what appears
to be conflicting evidence.
[1] The scope of the review on appeal
in equity cases is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. "This court is authorized by
the state Constitution to review the findings of the trial courts in equity cases, but
the findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence will not be set aside unless
it manifestly appears that the court has
misapplied proven facts or made findings
clearly against the weight of the evidence."
Ohvero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P.
313, 315.
To the same effect are Klopenstine v.
Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712; Singleton
v. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 P. 63, 66; Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P.
457; Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48
P.2d 513, 101 A.L.R. 532; Wilcox v. Coward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1; Hoyt v. Upper
Marion Ditch Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P.2d
234.
Let it be here observed that it is not
contended that there is not a substantial
conflict in the evidence. The defendant,
however, assigns as error the ruling of the
court in excluding the defendant's testimony of the delivery of the deed to her
by the testator shortly after its execution,
and upon the same principle that the court
erred in not permitting her to identify the
signature of the testator to a document
which, it is claimed, would tend to support
her cla,m of ownership. It is further contended by the defendant that the court

should have excluded statements made by
the testator to third persons to the effect
that he owned the property. Had the court
adopted the defendant's theory and admitted the evidence offered by the defendant
and had excluded evidence offered by the
plaintiff over defendant's objection, that
would not, however, dispose of the conflict, but it is insisted that except for the
errors complained of the evidence would
have so preponderated in favor of the defendant as to lead to a different conclusion.
The testimony upon which the plaintiff
relies, and which it is contended is inconsistent with the defendant's claim that the
deed was delivered to her, may be briefly
summarized, as follows:
The testator left the management of the
various properties acquired by them before their separation, including 823 and
825 Twenty-Fifth Street, to the defendant.
Shortly after their separation the testator
consulted counsel about obtaining payment
of the rents on these houses directly to
him. In February, 1934, he notified the
defendant that he would thereafter care
for his property, shortly after which he
rented one house, and in May, 1935, moved
into the other, occupying a part and renting a part. He exercised exclusive ownership of this property until his death in
November, 1937. In 1935 he mortgaged
the property without objection from the
defendant, or the assertion of any claim
of ownership, although she refused to join
in the mortgage. The testator left a will
devising his real property to the plaintiff
personally. He neither claimed or owned
any other real estate. The defendant had
access to the desk in which he kept his
papers at all times since the execution of
the deed under which she claims, and after the death of testator his personal effects were removed to the home of defendant. In 1934, the testator left with
one Forrest all the keys to the property
and defendant demanded of him that he
deliver the keys to her, which demand was
refused on the ground that she was not
the owner. She at that time asserted no
claim of ownership. Immediately after
the death of the testator the defendant filed a petition for the probate of a will dated in 1892, in which the defendant was the
sole beneficiary. She alleged in a -verified
petition that the testator owned the property in question at the time of his death
The defendant had alwa)s attended to the
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incidents of acquiring, renting and preserving her own property and was therefore familiar with the matters entering into the transfer of titles. When told that
some wall paper had been sent to the testator's place on 25th Street, the defendant
said: "If it had gone up to my place you
would have gotten that money." Pending
the proceedings for probate of the 1892
will, a later will was discovered by George
C. Stanley, dated in 1934, in which the
plaintiff was made the sole beneficiary.
The defendant was advised of the discovery and the will was filed with the Clerk
of the Court on November 27, 1937. On
December 8, 1937, the defendant received
notice of the hearing on the petition for
probate of the later will. The deed was
filed for record by the defendant on February 15, 1938. Shortly before that, according to the testimony of her daughter
Emily, the defendant brought out a box
and looking over the papers she found that
deed. In 1913, the testator procured insurance in his own name on the property
in question, which he renewed from time
to time until shortly before his death. The
defendant insured her properties with the
same agency. Due to the testator's frequent absences the policies and statements
for premiums were usually mailed to the
defendant, who promptly paid the premiums upon the several properties standing
in her name. The testator invariably paid
the premium on the property here in question, except the last premium on the policy issued shortly before the testator's
death, and for which a claim has been filed
against the estate.
With respect to the delivery of the deed,
the trial court excluded evidence offered
by the defendant as to the formal act of
delivery as being incompetent under the
provisions of Section 104-49-2, R.S.U. 1933.
However, she was permitted to testify that
she first saw the deed on May 19, 1906, in
the testator's hands and next saw it in her
own hands after which she immediately
placed it in a tin box; that when she first
saw the deed the testator was removing it
from his pocket, remarking that he had
a present for her, and handed it to her,
and that she paid him a dollar, requesting
however, that the deed be not recorded until after his death, and that thereafter it
remained in her possession.
[2,3] This testimony would undoubtedly justify an inference that the deed was
delivered and should be considered prima

facie sufficient for that purpose. The inference is not conclusive, nor would the
presumption arising from the possession
of the deed by the defendant be conclusive.
[4-6] Was the behavior of the testator
and of the defendant subsequent to their
separation inconsistent with the claim that
the deed was delivered with intent to presently pass title? It is apparent that the
testator thereafter exercised all of the indicia of ownership by entering into the exclusive possession of the premises, taking
insurance in his own name, redeeming the
property from a tax sale, mortgaging the
property with the knowledge of the defendant, disposing of the property by will, collecting rents, paying taxes and assuming
all expenses of upkeep, all without any
protest or objection or claim by or on behalf of the defendant. In the course of
these various transactions he had repeatedly stated and represented that he was
the owner of the property, such statements,
however, being admissible only upon the
question of intent to presently pass title, if
in fact there had been a manual delivery.
"Since delivery is essentially a matter
of intent, which intent is to be arrived at
from all the facts and surrounding circumstances, we believe the better rule is to include in those facts and circumstances declarations of the grantor both before and
after the date of the deed, at least where
it appears that the declarations are made
fairly and in the ordinary course of life."
Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911,
914.
Then also these declarations were reinforced by the sworn declaration of the defendant in her petition for probate of a
will to the effect that the testator was the
owner of this property at the time of his
death.
In this respect a very natural question
presents itself. If, as the defendant claims,
she had in her possession the deed at the
time of testator's death, why not then record the deed instead of offering the will
for probate, and thus avoid subjecting the
property to the claims of creditors, not to
mention the difference in the expense of
the two respective procedures? Then a
later will is found which is filed for probate in which the plaintiff is named as
beneficiary and of which proceedings the
defendant had notice. Some three months
elapsed before the deed was placed of record. Had the defendant been mentally m-
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firm, or inexperienced in matters of business, or indifferent to her own interests,
or had she forgotten about the deed, such
might afford some explanation of these inconsistencies. The record, however, discloses no satisfactory explanation of the
defendant's extraordinary behavior, and
the facts tend quite convincingly to support the plaintiff's theory that the deed was
discovered among the testator's papers after the later will had been filed for probate.
[7] As we view the evidence in this
case the findings of the trial court are
amply supported by the evidence, and this
would be true even though the defendant
had been permitted to testify as to the manual delivery of the deed, and quite as effectually disposes of all presumptions in
the defendant's favor which would cast the
burden of proving non-delivery upon the
plaintiff.
There being no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed, with costs to the respondent.
MOFFAT, C. J., and LARSON and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur.
WOLFE, Justice (concurring).
I concur in the results. It would perhaps be well if we fastened upon an accurate and consistent expression of the judicial policy of this court in the review
of equity cases. The Constitution of Utah,
Art. VIII, Sec. 9, not only gives us authority but makes it our duty to review
the facts. This has been construed to mean
that we review and weigh the evidence as
it appears in the record. Lund v. Howell,
92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215 (followed in Id.,
92 Utah 250, 67 P.2d 223); Christenson v.
Nielsen, 88 Utah 336, 54 P.2d 430, 432
(where this court held that in an equity
case the appellate court was "compelled to
review the record and pass on the weight
and sufficiency of the evidence"); Buzianis
v. Buzianis, 81 Utah 1/16 P.2d 413 (where
the court held that where there was a conflict in the evidence it was the court's duty
"to pass upon the relative weight thereof").
The cases are replete with expressions
as to the tests to be applied to determine
when we will reverse or affirm m an equity
case. They vary considerably. Hereunder are cited cases from this jurisdiction
with various expressions used. Skola v.
Merrill, 91 Utah 253, 64 P.2d 185 (where

this court reversed the trial court because
the "fair preponderance" of the evidence
was the other way); Chapman v. Troy
Laundry Co., 87 Utah 15, 47 P.2d 1054,
1056 (where it was held that the Supreme
Court has the burden of determining
"whether the findings of fact are supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence") ; Transfer Realty Co. v. Lichfield,
84 Utah 163, 33 P.2d 179, 181, rehearing
denied, 85 Utah 451, 39 P.2d 752 (where
it was held that this court "may examine
the evidence to determine whether or not
the trial court's findings are supported by
a preponderance of the evidence"); Lake
Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club,
50 Utah 76, 166 P. 309, 310, L.R.A.1918B,
620 (where it was held that the Supreme
Court has the power "to review the testimony for the purpose of determining what
the facts are * * * even though its
views are in conflict with the findings of
the trial court"); Forbes v. Butler, 66
Utah 373, 242 P. 950, 951 (holding it incumbent on the court "to review the evidence and decide the case according to the
facts as we find them to be, bearing m
mind legal presumptions in favor of the
judgment"); and Garfield Banking Co. v.
Arg>le, 64 Utah 572, 232 P. 541, 542 (holding that the Supreme Court in weighing
evidence should take into consideration the
fact that the "trial court was not bound
to give the same weight or effect to all
the statements made by the several witnesses").
In Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d
513, 520, 101 A.L.R. 532, a well considered
case, it was stated: "After a careful reading of the entire testimony of this witness,
and weighing the same along with the admitted facts in the case, we do not feel satisfied that the finding ought to be disturbed. The trial judge did not accept the
testimony of this witness in full. The trial judge had a better opportunity from
seeing and hearing the witness than we
have from merely reading the transcript
to appraise his credibility and to determine
what weight should be given to his testimony. The opinion of the trial judge is
therefore entitled to some weight with us."
Other cases containing similar expressions are as follows: Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674; Silver King
Consol. Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297,
39 P.2d 682, Corev v. Roberts, 82 Utah
445, 25 P.2d 940, Consolidated Wagon &
Machine Co. v. Ka\, 81 Utah 595, 21 P.
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2d 836; Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah
389, 274 P. 457; Warner v. Tyng Warehouse Co., 71 Utah 303, 265 P. 748; Ephraim Willow Creek Irr. Co. v. Olson, 70
Utah 95, 258 P. 216; Schulder v. Dickson,
66 Utah 418, 243 P. 377; Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63 Utah 329, 226 P. 177; McKellar
Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Paxton,
62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128; Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Utah 298, 212 P. 526; Bracken v. Chadburn, 55 Utah 430, 185 P. 1021;
Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah
10, 177 P. 418; Campbell v. Gowans, 35
Utah 268, 100 P. 397, 23 L.R.A.,N.S., 414,
19 Ann.Cas. 660 (followed in Utah Com.
& Savings Bank v. Fox, 44 Utah 323, 140
P. 660; and Little v. Stringfellow, 46 Utah
576, 151 P. 347): Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah
609, 151 P. 57; Froyd v. Barnhurst, 83
Utah 271, 28 P.2d 135; Paxton v. Paxton,
80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051; Thomas v. Butler, 77 Utah 402, 296 P. 597; Clark v.
Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502; Olivero
v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313 (and
cases cited); Singleton v. Kelly, 61 Utah
277, 212 P. 63 (and cases cited); Rieske
v. Hoover, 53 Utah 87, 177 P. 228.
The expressions range all the way from
that which says a review in equity in this
court is a trial de novo on the record, to
that taken from Olivero v. Eleganti, supra, contained in the main opinion.
I opine that what was really meant was
that on review we would go over the record to determine what our conclusions of
fact were from the transcript of the evidence, and if at the end of that investigation we were in doubt or even if there
might be a slight preponderance in our
minds against the trial court's conclusions,
we would affirm. This is because we
would be confined to the dry written record and would not have the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses. In some
cases that would be quite valuable while
in others, where the evidence was purely
or almost altogether documentary, it might
be practically valueless. Such a distinction was noted in the concurring opinion
in Greco v. Grako, 85 Utah 241, 39 P.2d
318, 322, where it was said: "I am not
unmindful of the rule to the effect that,
^while a written record in an equity case
tnay apparently show the preponderance
of evidence in favor of a conclusion different from that reached by the trial judge,
still the benefit of the doubt should be given to his conclusions where the imponderables, not revealed by the record, such as
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the manner and demeanor of the witnesses
(very important indexes to credibility),
might weigh in the scale sufficiently to reverse that apparent preponderance of the
record. Where, however, the preponderance shown by the record is so great in
favor of a conclusion different from that
arrived at by the trial judge that the unrecorded parts of the trial could not reasonably be expected to change such apparent preponderance, or where, as in this
case, some fact independent of any element which might affect the credibility of
witnesses speaks eloquently of a wrong
conclusion by the trial judge, the rule does
not apply."
The reason then that we have the expressions that in order to reverse there
must be shown a "clear preponderance" or
"fair preponderance" of the evidence the
other way or that we must "bear in mind
legal presumptions in favor of the judgment" etc., is because of this recognition
that the lower court had the witnesses before it and was better able to judge of their
credibility. This is borne out by the following expressions:
In Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d
940, 942, the court held: "In equity cases
the appeal (Const. Utah, art. 8, § 9) may
be on questions of both law and fact. Such
is the appeal in this case. On such review the duty of this court requires an
examination of all questions of law and
all facts revealed by the record, and, after making such examination and due allowance for the better opportunity afforded the trial court to observe the demeanor of witnesses, and more advantageous
position of determining their credibility
and the weight to be given to the testimony submitted, this court, analogous to
a trial de novo on the record, will determine from a fair preponderance or greater weight of the evidence whether or not
the findings of the trial court are supported thereby. Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61
Utah 298, 212 P. 526."
In Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co.,
supra, the court stated [53 Utah 10, 177
P. 420]: "While this court will, and it
is its duty in equitable proceedings to, review the testimony and determine its
weight, of necessity much consideration
must and will be given to the trial courts
findings, not only because such court heard
the witnesses and had an opportunity to
observe their demeanor upon the witness
stand, their means of knowledge, their in-
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terests, etc., but particularly in this case to subscribe to the doctrine of Mower v.
greater consideration should be given to Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911, although
the court's finding by reason of the court's it may be the law of this state.
opportunity in visiting the plant and vicinIt may be contended that even though
ity, and seeing from personal investigation there is no direct evidence of manual handand observation the conditions that exist ing over from Willis to Emily Stanley, the
there."
inference from her testimony that she saw
I think hardly accurate the expression in the deed in his hand and next saw it in
Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., supra, that her hand raises the inference of delivery.
the Supreme Court has the burden of de- While I have grave doubts whether the
termining "whether the findings of fact rule of Sec. 104-49-2, R.S.U.1933, may be
are supported by a fair preponderance of circumvented by admitting every fact surthe evidence." Our duty is to make an in- rounding the fact which is to be concluddependent examination of the record. If ed from them, when such facts themselves
after that we find (1) the preponderance were "equally within the knowledge", no
of the evidence supports the trial court's cross assignment of error was made as to
findings of fact, or (2) if there is doubt their admission hence they must stand as
in our minds as to where the preponder- correctly admitted for this review. But I
ance lies, or (3) we think the evidence as do not think the inference that a manual
revealed by the record may slightly pre- handing over took place need be indulged.
ponderate against its conclusions but such Certainly when the facts from which we
preponderance may well be offset in fa- are asked to infer were wrongly admitted
vor of his conclusions by having seen the and we are asked to draw an inference
witnesses and been able to judge by their which will reverse the trial court in its
demeanor as to their credibility, then we findings, we will do so only when it is the
will not reverse. The expressions that necessary and only inference. I do not see
there must be a "clear" or "fair" prepon- that it is such in this case. For that readerance of the evidence against the find- son I found my concurrence on the asings of the trial judge, seek to allow for sumption that it does not appear in this
his advantaged position in having seen the case that there was any delivery of the
deed.
behavior of the witnesses on the stand.
In short, as held in Wilcox v. Cloward,
PRATT, J., being disqualified, did not
88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1, if after we review the record we cannot say that the participate herein.
court came to a wrong conclusion, we
should affirm. We do not reverse if we
find the court's findings supported by a
fair preponderance of the evidence, or if
supported only by a slight preponderance,
or if the evidence is evenly balanced, or
even if there is in the record a slight preponderance the other way, for the reasons
CHOURNOS v. EVONA INV. CO. et al.
above set out.
No. 6092.
Being convinced that evidence of delivSupreme Court of Utah.
ery of the deed from Willis O. Stanley to>
Emily C. Stanley should not be receivedI
Oct. 17, 1939.
because Emily C Stanley was incompetent
under Sec. 104-49-2, R.S.U.1933, I shallI Landlord and tenant <§=>95
Joint lease of grazing land, which protreat the case as if there was no evidence»
of delivery. This makes it unnecessaryr vided that, in event of a sale of land being
for me to determine whether declarationsj made to any person not a party to the lease,
of a decedent tending to show ownership> the lessees 6hould be given one year within
in him after a manual handing of a deedi which to vacate the premises, after which
from himself to another when the deed rani the lease should be canceled, contemplated
to that other are admissible in evidence» that, except for a purchase by a stranger,
to find the intent with which the deed was5 each lessee should continue the grazing of
so handed, especially where not made con-. sheep upon the land at least for the period
temporaneously with the manual act. I[ of the lease, and hence, if purchase of the
am not prepared, without further research, leased premises by a lessee's son was made
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It appears that appellants, the prevailing
parties on their appeal, presented to the
clerk a duly certified cost bill for his approval and allowance. The item objected to
and sustained by the clerk is as follows:
"Paid to Lew Rogers, court reporter, for
typing transcript testimony of proceedings used
in the transcript on appeal, $276.31."
The clerk ruled, that the item was not a
proper item of costs authorized by section 1
of rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules. We
are not in accord with this ruling. The
rule itself furnishes a sufficient answer to
the objection to the allowance of the item.
Section 1 provides as follows:
"The expense of printing or typewriting transcripts • * * on appeal in civil causes * * *
shall be allowed as costs, and taxed in bills of
costs in the usual mode. * * * "
No sufficient reason appears why appellants should not be allowed the expense of
transcribing the testimony upon which their
appeal was based, and which was actually
used on appeal.
The clerk's'decision is reversed.
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and, in absence of proof to contrary, plaintiff
made out a prima fade case.
4. Bills and notes £=»395—Presentment for
payment unnecessary In action against
drawee and acceptor.
Under Comp. Laws 1917, § 4105, in action
on trade acceptances against drawee and acceptor, who is primarily liable, presentment for
payment is not necessary.
5. Corporations ^=>5I4(I)—Contention that
complaint failed to allege plaintiff's capacity
_ to sue without merit where defendant admitted that plaintiff was a corporation.
Contention that complaint failed to allege
plaintiff's capacity to sue held without merit,
where defendant admitted that plaintiff was a
corporation, thus admitting its capacity to sue.
6. Appeal and error €=>1170(3)—Failure of
complaint to allege acceptance of trade acceptances by defendant held harmless, where
proof thereof made without objection or exception by defendant.
Though complaint in action on trade acceptances did not expressly allege acceptance by
defendant, Held that, in view of Comp. Laws
1917, § 6622, where plaintiff proved fact of acceptance, and no objection or exception was
taken to 6uch proof, failure of complaint to soallege was harmless.

COLEMAN, C. J., and DUCKER, J., con7. Bills and notes <g=>485—General denial of
cur.
execution of written instrument or corporate
capacity of plaintiff held insufficient.
Under Comp. Laws 1917, § 6594, providing
that allegations of execution of written instruGRAY'S HARBOR LUMBER CO. V. BUR- ment, existence of corporation, etc., shall be
taken as true unless denial thereof be verified
TON LUMBER CO. (No. 4106.)
by affidavit, defendant, intending to assail any
of such matters, should clearly specify which
' (Supreme Court of Utah. May 11, 1925.)
one he desires to assail, and a mere general
1. Appeal and error G=>277—Only such mat- denial is insufficient, i
ters reviewed as deemed excepted to under
statute, where no objection nor exception
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lakesaved below.
County; Ephraim Hanson, Judge.
Where defendant interposed no objection
Action by the Gray's Harbor Lumber Comand saved no exception in district court, Supreme Court can only examine such matters as pany against the Burton Lumber Company.
are deemed excepted to under the statute.
Judgment for plaintiff on appeal from city2. Judgment €=»18(2)—Complaint in action on court, and defendant appeals. Modified, and
trade acceptances held not so lacking in es- affirmed as modified.
sential averments as not to support judgment
Ball, Musser & Robertson, of Salt Lak*
for plaintiff.
City, for appellant
ID action against drawee and acceptor on
Irvine, Skeen & Thurman, of Salt Lake
trade acceptance being an action on written in- City, for respondent
strument for payment of money only, complaint, which did not specifically allege ownerFRICK, J. This action was commenced inship or right of possession, held not so lacking
in essential averments as not to support judg- the city court of Salt Lake City. Judgment
ment for plaintiff especially in view of fact that was there entered in favor of the plaintiff
no defense was interposed under general denial. and against the defendant, and the latter
appealed to the district court of Salt Lake
3. Bills and notes C=>524—Plaintiff suing on county.
trade acceptances held to have made prima
The complaint in the city court, omitting,
facie case of ownership by producing instruthe prayer, reads as follows:
ment, where no proof to contrary.
"Comes now the plaintiff and for cause alAn action on trade acceptances, being an action on written instrument for recovery of leges:
44
money only, where instrument was in posses(1) That it is a company organized under
sion of plaintiff and was produced in court, and pursuant to the laws of the state of Washpresumption that plaintiff was owner prevailed, ington.
<£=»For other cases Bee same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
1
Brewer v. Romney, 50 Utah, 236, 167 P. 366.
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GUAY'S HARBOR LUMBER
(231

"(2) That on or about the 30th day of September, 1922, the defendant made, executed,
and delivered to the plaintiff its trade acceptance in words and figures as follows, to wit:
Trade Acceptance. $439 58. Salt Lake City,
Utah, Sept. 30, 1922. 60 days after date pay
to the order of Gray's Harbor Lbr. Co. four
hundred thirty-nine and 58-100 dollars. The
obligation of the acceptor of this bill arises out
of the purchase of goods from drawer. The
drawee may make this trade acceptance payable at any bank, banker or trust company
which he may designate. Gray's Harbor Lumber Co., by C. G. Blagdon, Secretary. To Burton Lumber Company, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Accepted Sept. 30, 1922, payable Continental
National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah. Burton
Lumber Company, by W. J. Burton, Treaa.'
"(3) That thereafter plaintiff duly presented said trade acceptance for payment through
the said Continental National Bank, and the
same was returned with protest fees in the
amount of $4.77, and that, although demand
has been made, the said trade acceptance or no
part thereof has been paid."
In the city court a general demurrer was
interposed to the complaint, which was overruled.
The defendant's answer, omitting the introduction and the prayer, reads as follows:
"(1) Admits the allegations contained in
paragraph 1 of said complaint.
"(2) Denies each and every allegation and
averment in said complaint not hereinabove
specifically admitted."

:o v BiiiTor; LUMBEP CO.
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only such matters as are deemed excepted
to under the statute.
[2, 3] It is insisted that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action. We have set
forth both the complaint and the answer
in fulL While the complaint is far from
being a model pleading, yet it is not so
lacking in essential averments that it will
not support a judgment. In passing upon
the sufficiency of a complaint we must keep
in mind that the demurrer was not called
to the attention of the district court, and
that that court made no ruling whatever
with respect thereto. True, a demurrer was
interposed in the city court, but an answer
was subsequently filed in that court. The
case, it seems, was considered in the district court entirely upon the complaint and
answer. Moreover, the action is based upon
a written instruments for the recovery of
money only. The instrument was in the
possession of the plaintiff and was produced
in court. Under all the authorities, therefore, the presumption that the plaintiff was
the owner prevailed, and, in the absence of
any proof to the contrary, the plaintiff made
out a prima facie case when it produced
the instrument The contention, therefore,
that the plaintiff must fail because it failed
to allege ownership or right of possession
is without merit.
[4] It is further contended that the plaintiff must fail because it did not prove presentment for payment. This action is
against the drawee and acceptor who is
primarily liable. In such an action presentment for payment is not necessary. Comp.
Laws Utah 1917, { 4105; Brannan's Neg.
Inst. Law (3d Ed.) 255, § 70.
[5] It is further contended that the complaint failed to allege plaintiff's capacity to
sue. In view *)f the state of the pleadings,
as will hereinafter more fully appear, there
is no merit to this contention. Moreover,
the record discloses that the defendant admitted that the plaintiff was a corporation
and hence admitted its capacity to sue.
16] It is, however, strenuously insisted
that the complaint was fatally defective
because it did not allege acceptance by the
defendant It is true that the plaintiff did
not in express terms allege acceptance, but
it certainly proved the fact of acceptance.
No objection was interposed nor any exception taken to the proof. In view of that,
this case falls squarely within the provisions of our statute (Comp. Laws Utah
1917, { 6622), which provides:
"The court most in every stage of an action
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings
or proceedings, which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties, and no judgment
shall be reversed or affected by reason of such
error or defect"

Both the complaint and the answer were
duly verified. No pleadings were filed in the
district court, and no ruling of any kind respecting the pleadings filed in the city court
was made in the district court.
Upon the issues presented by the complaint and answer, the case proceeded to
trial in the district court. The plaintiff produced the original trade acceptance and
offered the same in evidence, together with
the indorsements thereon. His counsel then
turned to defendant's counsel and asked
whether the latter admitted nonpayment
Counsel for defendant said he assumed that
the fact that the acceptance was outstanding was evidence of its nonpayment. The
plaintiff then rested. The defendant, without any objection or taking any exception,
and without producing evidence, also rested.
The court made findings in favor of the
plaintiff, and entered judgment accordingly.
Defendant filed its motion for a new trial,
which was overruled, and this appeal followed.
[1] Notwithstanding the fact that no objection was interposed and no exception taken in the district court, twenty-seven errors
are assigned in this court, nearly all of
which are relied on for a reversal of the
Judgment In view that the defendant inLet it be remembered also that this is an
terposed no objection and saved no exceptions in the district court, we can examine action to recover upon a written instrument
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for the payment of money only. Judgment 1 sential in a pleading, are nevertheless mora
was entered against the -defendant in two or less formal. Moreover, they occur in alcourts. No defense of any kind was inter- most all actions and are seldom assailed. In
posed, and no explanation was made why -view of that, it is but fair and just, and
judgment should not be so entered. No de- certainly comports with the due and just adfense or explanation is now suggested; yet ministration of justice, that, in case a deit is vigorously contended that the allega- fendant intends to assail any of those fortions of the complaint are insufficient to mal matters, he should specifically indicate
authorize a judgment. We have already it in his answer. Moreover, he should clearpointed out that, while the complaint is lack- ly specify which one of the several matters
ing in specific averments, it nevertheless is I he desires to assail, so that proper preparanot so lacking in essentials as to authorize tion can be made on the part of the plainthis court to reverse the judgment. This is tiff to establish the matter or matters in
especially true in view that the answer of dispute. If a mere general denial is held
the defendant fails to state any defense sufficient to authorize an attack upon the
whatever. True, the answer is a general authority of the execution of a written indenial, but what does it deny? Can one, strument, or to assail the corporate capacity
by a mere general denial, and without any of plaintiff, or any of the other matters
proof whatever, prevent a recovery upon a enumerated in the statute, then no one could
written instrument for the payment of mon- tell in advance what the contested issues
ey only where such instrument is produced in will be, and the plaintiff in every action
court by the terms of which appellant's must be prepared to sustain all of them,
promise to pay and its failure to do so are when perhaps none will be assailed at the
clearly established? Would it not be ameTe trial. Indeed, such a practice must necestravesty of justice to hold that, although sarily result in insisting upon the denial if
*he defendant voluntarily obligated itself to the plaintiff is not prepared but, if he is
pay and plaintiff has proved the promise prepared, to waive it.
and the failure to redeem the obligation,
While the record in this case in some reit nevertheless must be thrown out of court spects is fragmentary and incomplete, it no
because of some assumed technical defect doubt is so largely because of the fact that
in the complaint? In view of the nature the defendant at no time presented or sugof the action and the proceedings, and the gested any defense to the instrument sued
utter failure of the defendant to suggest or on, and thus both the plaintiff and the court
to present any defense to the written instru- were somewhat careless in making a comment at any time save by merely interposing plete record.
a general denial, there can be no question
The defendant, however, also insists that
respecting plaintiff's right to judgment.
the evidence is insufficient to sustain the
[7] The objections to the complaint prac- judgment for the $4.77 protest fees allowed
tically all belong to that class which are by the district court; moreover, that there
admitted unless specifically denied. This is error in the judgment for costs. The
court has already held that under our stat- plaintiff concedes that, in view that it failute (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, f 6594) the ed to prove the protest fees, and that a cost
execution of an instrument is not available bill was not served and filed within the time
under a general denial. Brewer v. Romney, required by our statute, both of those items
50 Utah, 236, 167 P. 366. That section pro- should be omitted, and that it voluntarily
remits the foregoing items from the judgvides:
"In all actions, allegations of the execution ment.
The judgment is therefore modified by
of written instruments and indorsements thereon, of the existence of a corporation or part- I eliminating therefrom the item of $4.77 as
nership, or of any appointment or authority, or protest fees, and further by eliminating the
the correctness of any account duly verified by amount allowed as costs, and, as so modified,
the affidavit of the party, his agent or attorney, the judgment is affirmed, with costs, on apshall be taken as true, unless the denial of the peal to plaintiff.
same be verified by the affidavit of the party,
his agent or attorney."
GIDEON, C. J., CHERRY, J„ and
If that section means anything, it means CHRISTENSEN, District Judge, concur.
that, unless the defendant specifically denies
The term of office of Hon. A. J. WEBER,
the matters enumerated in the section they who was Chief Justice, expired before dispowill be "taken as true.'* The statute is sition of this case.
wholesome and of the highest utility. The
THURMAN, J., being disqualified, did not
matters referred to in the statute, while es- participate herein.
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PARKLR v. WLIibk COUNTy
(286 P.)

CALIFORNIA PINE BOX DISTRIBUTORS,
Respondent, v. BURTON LUMBER CO.,

Appellant. (No. 4107.)
(Supreme Court of Utah. May 11, 1925.)
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake
County; Ephraim Hanson, Judge.
Ball, Musser & Robertson, of Salt Lake
City, for appellant.
Irvine, Skeen & Thurman, of Salt Lake
City, for respondent.
FRICK, J. This action Is based upon a
trade acceptance in all respects similar to
the one involved in the case of Gray's Harbor Lumber Company v. Burton Lumber Co.,
236 P. 1102, just decided. The record is in
the same condition as was the record in that
case, and the questions presented for review
are the same, except that in this case no
protest fees were allowed.
For the reasons stated in the case just
referred to, the judgment in this case is
modified by eliminating therefrom the
amount allowed as court costs, and, as so
modified, the judgment is affirmed with
costs, on appeal to plaintiff.
GIDEON, C. J., CHERRY, J., and
CHRISTENSEN, District Judge, concur.
The term of office of Hon. A. J. WEBER,
who was Chief Justice, expired before disposition of this case.
THURMAN, J., being disqualified, did not
participate herein.

PARKER v. WEBER COUNTY IRR. DIST.
(No. 4142.)

(Supreme Court of Utah. May 23, 1925.)
1. Master and servant <§=»68—Engineer's right
to payment held not dependent on actual rendition of services.
Engineer's right to payment under contract of employment with irrigation district,
terminable at any time, held not dependent on
his performance of any services, but only on
contract remaining effective and manner provided therein.
2. Evidence €=^444(2)—Exclusion of evidence,
showing Irrigation district's notice to engineer rendering contract of employment effective had been given on condition which was
never fulfilled, held error.
In action against drainage district for compensation due engineer under contract of employment, which plaintiff alleged became effective on notice given by district, it was error to exclude evidence adduced by district
to show that notice was given on condition
which was never fulfilled and so understood
and accepted by plaintiff.

i:ot. LIST.

iios

3. Contracts €=>42—Written instrument delivered on condition does not become effective
until happening of contingency provided for.
Where written instrument, regardless of
nature, is delivered on express agreement that
it shall not become effective except on happening of certain contingency, it does not become
effective until that event occurs.
4. Evidence $=>444(2)~That written instrument was delivered on condition that it should
not become effective until happening of certain
contingency may be shown by parol.
That written instrument was delivered on
condition that it should not become effective
until happening 1of certain contingency may be
shown by parol.
5. Contracts <§=>238(2)—Evidence <§=>445(l)—
Written instrument may be modified by parol
agreement; parol modifying agreement may
be established by parol evidence.
Duly executed written agreement may be
modified by subsequent oral agreement made
same day, parol proof of which is admissible,
and in action against irrigation district for
payments due engineer under written contract
of employment parol proof of oral agreement
modifying written contract sued on was improperly excluded.
6. Appeal and error ®=>837(12)—Improperly
excluded evidence cannot be examined except
to determine its admissibility, unless parties
so stipulate.
On appeal, improperly excluded evidence
can only be examined for purpose of determining its admissibility, and cannot be considered
by court, except parties stipulate to its correctness and authorize its consideration.
Appeal from District Court, Weber County ; J. N. Kimball, Judge.
Action by A. F. Parker against the Weber
County Irrigation District, wherein Wynne
M. Parker, administrator of the estate of A.
F. Parker, was substituted as party plaintiff. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff
appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Pratt & Pratt, of Ogden, for appellant.
A. G. Horn, of Ogden, for respondent.
FRICK, J. A. F. Parker commenced this
action in the district court of Weber county
against the defendant Weber county irrigation district to recover for services pursuant
to the terms of a certain contract of employment entered into between him and said district. After the action was commenced and
pending, Parker died, and his son, the plaintiff named in the caption, was substituted, as
administrator of the estate of the deceased.
In the complaint, after stating the necessary jurisdictional facts and matters of inducement, it is in substance alleged that on
the 16th day of December, 1920, the deceased
entered into a contract with said district, by
the terms of which he was to perform cer-

$rs>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER In all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
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It is undisputed that the conduct of counsel
in a criminal case may be such as to den\
the defendant the fair trial contemplated by
the due process clauses of both the State
and Federal Constitutions. People v. De
Simone, 9 I11.2d 522, 524, 138 N.E.2d 556
(1956). However, our courts have repeatedly held that where the defendant is represented by counsel of his own choice, the
judgment of conviction will not be reversed merely because his counsel failed to exercise the greatest of skill or for the reason
that it might appear in looking back over
the trial that he made some tactical blunder.
In order to vitiate the trial, the whole of the
representation must be of such low caliber
as to amount to no representation and reduce the trial to a farce. People v. Stephens, 6 I11.2d 257, 259, 260, 128 N.E.2d
731 (1955); People v. Morris, 3 U1.2d
437, 443, 448, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954). Defendant here was represented by counsel
of his own choice and the record indicated
that counsel creditably conducted the defense against insurmountable factual odds.
[29] The defendant also argues that the
imposition by the court of an imprisonment term of from not less than one year
and six months to not more than two
years, upon the revocation of the probation,
was excessive. The sentence was within
the maximum penalty for the offense of
which the defendant had been convicted.
(111. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 38, section 117-3
( d ) ; and ch. llli/S, par. 441.) We recognize that this court may reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court if the circumstances warrant such reduction. 111.
Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, section 121-9 (b) (4).
[30,31] The power to reduce a sentence
is one that is to be exercised with caution.
The imposition of sentence is peculiarly
within the discretion of the trial court.
This discretion should not be interfered
with unless clearly abused. People v. Stevens, 68 Ill.App.2d 265, 273, 215 N.E.2d
147 (2nd Dist. 1966); People v. Burks,
NUpp., 215 N.E.2d 144 (2nd Dist. 1966);
People v. Brown, 60 Ill.App.2d 447, 450,

208 N.E.2d 629 (1st Dist. 1965); People v.
Hobbs, 56 Ill.App.2d 93, 98, 99, 205 X.E.2d
503 (1st Dist. 1965).
[32] Prior to imposing sentence, the
trial court stated, among other things, that
it appeared from the evidence that the defendant had made a mockerv of its probation order; and that the defendant's testimony at the revocation hearing was fantastic and beyond belief. Under the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse
of discretion in imposing sentence, and,
accordingly, the judgment must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
T H O M A S J . M O R A N , P. J., and ABRAH A M S O N , J., concur.
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In the Matter of the ESTATE of Bessie
BICKFORD, Deceased, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Vern L. BICKFORD, Jr., RespondentAppellant.
Gen. No. 66-6.

Appellate Court of Illinois.
Third District.
Aug. 5, 1966.

Action by administratrix to recover assets from intestate's son. The Circuit
Court, Rock Island County, Probate Division, Forest Dizotell, J., rendered judgment
for administratrix and son appealed. The
Appellate Court, Stouder, J., held that evidence made prima facie case that assets
consisting of money, tractor, and space
heater were owned by intestate at time of
her death and that son failed to carry
burden of proving change of possession or
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control or any other circumstance from
which change of ownership could be inferred
Affirmed

1. Executors and Administrators <§=*59
Burden of proof in citation proceeding
to recover estate assets is on petitioner until
petitioner has presented prima facie case of
ownership by decedent, at which time burden of establishing ownership shifts to person claiming the assets.
2. Executors and Administrators <S=>59
Evidence that money sought to be recovered by administratrix in citation proceedings was in pocket of dress owned by
intestate and in her control until time of her
removal to hospital presented prima facie
case of ownership of such money by intestate.
3. Executors and Administrators <§=*59
Where evidence presented prima facie
case of ownership of assets by intestate at
time of death, evidence that intestate shortly before death had stated that contested
assets belonged to son and son's uncorroborated testimony that he had received
assets as gift did not establish son's ownership, in absence of change of possession
or control, delivery either actual or constructive or any other circumstance from
which change of ownership could be inferred.

Stewart R. Winstein, Rock Island, for
appellant.
Long, Gende & Schrager, E. Moline, for
appellee.
STOUDER, Justice.
Petitioner Appellee, Bessie A. Winger,
Administratrix of the estate of Bessie Bickford, commenced this action as a part of
the probate proceedings pending in the Cir-

cuit Court of Rock Island County, by
filing her petition for citation against Vern
L. Bickford, Jr., Respondent, Appellant, to
recover assets belonging to the estate of the
deceased. This is an appeal from an order
of the court finding that $2,507.00, a tractor
and a space heater belonged to the decedent at the date of her decease and ordering Respondent to turn over the property to
the Petitioner, Administratrix.
Bessie Bickford died intestate on August
14, 1964, a resident of Rock Island County,
Illinois. Letters of Administration were
duly issued by the Circuit Court of Rock
Island County to Bessie A. Winger, a
daughter, Petitioner herein. Decedent left
as her heirs at law, several children including Petitioner and Respondent. Citation
proceedings were instituted by Petitioner to
recover a tractor, space heater and $2,507.00
in possession of Respondent, alleged to belong to decedent and hence considered part
of the estate.
The evidence presented consisted primarily of the testimony of Petitioner, Respondent, other children of decedent and the
former wife of Respondent. The evidence
is undisputed that the decedent, Bessie
Bickford, owned the house in which she
lived and that Respondent had lived with
her for most of his life including the period
of his marriage. The decedent operated A,
restaurant for twelve years prior to h#r
death. Decedent had been in ill health for
approximately three years being hospitalized for three months prior to her dealfc
After her death $2,507.00 was discovered #1
the pocket of her dress located in a stQttfij
room of her house. Decedent also kept hft
receipts and other business papers in w
same storeroom in^ which the dress was kejC
Respondent took possession of and cotmtro
the money in the presence of the othlK
children after the decease of Bessie B i « |
ford, the testimony being conflicting a s j | |
statements allegedly made by Respondent^
the time. Although denied by R e s p o n d ^
other witnesses testified that he s t a t e d « |
money was his mother's. The e v i d e n c e J | |
also conflicting concerning the posstijS
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sources of the money, Respondent in his
testimony claimed that he had received gifts
from his father and grandfather some years
earlier and that he had delivered the money
to his mother for safekeeping. Respondent
also testified that he had helped his mother
in the restaurant and that the restaurant
had been unprofitable for some time prior
to his mother's death. Other testimony indicated that Respondent had not been employed regularly for more than eight years
and that he had no money which he could
ha\e g n e n his mother. It also appears
r o m the testimony that three da>s before
her death the decedent had made a statement in the hospital in the presence of her
children to the effect that the money in the
dress was Respondent's. So far as the
tractor and space heater are concerned Respondent claimed that his mother had given
them to him approximately four years prior
to her death.
[1] Respondent, in seeking a reversal of
the order of the trial court, argues that the
order is against the manifest weight of the
t\ idence. The primary area of controversy
appears to be whether Petitioner or Respondent has the burden of proof. Respondent argues that the burden of proof in
a citation proceeding is on Petitioner. Petitioner does not dispute this but contends
that where Respondent does not obtain posscssion of property until after the death of
'lccedent, he has the burden of showing
ownership m himself. We believe there is
merit in both arguments but that such arguments are not inconsistent, finding support
as they do in the same Illinois authorities.
The burden of persuasion remains with
Petitioner but when Petitioner has presentc<
3 a prima facie case of ownership by the
decedent the burden of establishing ownership in himself shifts to Respondent.
Vercillo v. Gagliardi, 27 Ill.App.2d 151, 169
-VE.2d 364. To the same effect are, In re
H!
«'s Estate, 42 Ill.App.2d 396, 192 N.E.2d
429
and Storr v. Storr, 329 Ill.App. 537, 69
* E.2d 916 where the decedent had transcrr
ed possession of the disputed asset prior
his death and ownership of such asset
219 N E 2d—11

was claimed by donee as an inter vivos gift.
In the aforementioned cases the court concluded that the prima facie case of ownership had been presented by Petitioner thereby requiring Respondent donee to establish
the inter vivos gift to him by clear and
convincing evidence.
[2,3] It is in the application of these
rules and in their differing views of the
evidence that the parties disagree. Respondent contends that possession of the
money involved was not obtained after the
death of his mother but was ahva>s with
Respondent.
Therefore Petitioner has
failed to sustain her initial burden of proving ownership of the money by decedent.
We cannot agree with Respondent's analysis of the facts as shown by the evidence.
The evidence shows clearly that the money
involved was in the pocket of a dress owned
by decedent and in her control until the time
of her removal to the hospital. There is no
evidence showing any change in control at
that time or from that time to the date of
death. In our opinion, this establishes the
element of possession in decedent at the
time of death rather than in Respondent
and when considered with the other evidence amply presents a prima facie case of
ownership of such money by decedent.
This being the case, the burden was on Respondent to show by what right he claimed
ownership. The facts which Respondent
claims support his ownership of the money
are disputed in practically every material
respect. Even the statement of decedent
shortly before her death that the money
belonged to Respondent can be interpreted
as a desire of the decedent that Respondent
have such money after her death particularly when viewed in relation to other
testimony suggesting that Respondent expected special treatment in the disposition
of the decedent's estate. The trial court's
determination of facts adverse to the claim
of Respondent finds ample support in the
conflicting evidence and such determination
will not be disturbed on review.
As to the other items of personal property claimed to be gifts to Respondent by de-
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cedent, again, we have only Respondent's
assertion that they were gifts. The evidence discloses no change of possession or
control, no delivery either actual or constructive nor any other altered circumstance from which a change of ownership
can be inferred.
The authorities relied upon by Respondent all involve factual situations where actual possession of the property involved was
clearly in Respondent at the time of death
and have no application to the point at issue
in the instant case. We are here dealing
with the question of possession. Since we
find possession to have been in decedent
we must further find that Respondent did
not meet his burden of proving ownership
in himself and the decision of the lower
court must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CORYN, P. J., and ALLOY, J., concur.

dr> grass and which was only 15 or 20
feet from airplane, and then returned to
his house while fire was smouldering and
airplane was destroyed, evidence did not
rebut bailors' prima facie case of bailee's
negligence in that they had delivered plane
to bailee who could not return it upon
demand.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Goldenhersh, P. J., dissented.

1. Bailment <§=>I2

Gratuitous bailee is bound to take
such care in preservation of property intrusted to him as every prudent man takes
of his own goods of like character.
2. Bailment <S=*3I(I)

Burden of proceeding as to issue 6L
negligence shifts to bailee after bailor has]
shown that goods were received in good]
condition by bailee and not returned 4&1
bailor on demand.
3. Appeal and Error <§=>I003

73 Ill.App.2d 369
Bobby Ray CLARK and Warren H. Jordan,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
William B. FIELDS, Defendant-Appellee.
Gen. No. 65-74.

Appellate Court of Illinois.
Fifth District.
July 22, 1966.

Action against bailee of airplane which
was destroyed in fire which occurred in
back yard of bailee's home. The Circuit
Court, St. Clair County, Harold 0 . Farmer,
J., rendered judgment for bailee and bailors
appealed. The Appellate Court, Eberspacher, J., held that where bailee set fire to
trash in open gulley which was filled with

Reviewing court has duty to reversfe]
where verdict is clearly against manife$y
weight of evidence.
4. Bailment <©=>! I

Where bailee set fire to trash in op<SjSI
gulley which was filled with dry grass any
which was only 15 or 20 feet from aigl
plane, and returned to his house while fira
was smouldering and airplane was d e s t r ( jH|
ed, bailee did not use ordinary care ajjjfl
was liable for the loss.

Kassly, Weihl, Carr & Bone, East
Louis, for appellants, Rex Carr, East
Louis, of counsel.
Johnson, Ducey & Feder, Belleville,
appellee.
EBERSPACHER, Justice.

